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The implications of highly associated face and object recognition impairments 
for the cognitive architecture 
 
Towler, J. & Tree, J. J. 
 
Geskin & Behrmann provide an extensive and scholarly meta-analysis of the extant 
cases of developmental prosopagnosia (DP) in order to ascertain how often 
impairments in face recognition and object recognition co-occur, mirroring an 
influential review of the acquired agnosias by Farah (1991) published in this journal. 
The authors conclude that for the appropriately tested cases, the majority of 
individuals with DP (approximately 80%) have substantial object recognition 
difficulties that co-occur with face recognition impairments. The authors suggest that 
this strong co-occurrence of face and object recognition difficulties in DP is revealing 
about the underlying cognitive architecture and that face and object recognition rely 
upon shared cognitive mechanisms. In the current commentary we agree with 
Geskin & Behrmann that the common co-occurrence of face and object (but not 
word) recognition deficits in DP is an interesting and important observation, and we 
also agree that face and object recognition are likely to share some common 
cognitive and neural mechanisms. We propose that this evidence for category-
general recognition mechanisms needs to be carefully integrated with the strong 
evidence for category-specificity in visual processing. In this commentary we discuss 
what these category-specific and common shared mechanisms might be, and what 
such population-level statistics might tell us about the underlying cognitive 
architecture.  
The use of population level statistics to infer cognitive structure can be traced 
back to the roots of individual differences psychometric research including the study 
of intelligence (e.g. Spearman, 1904). Such investigations utilise population-level 
statistics to infer properties of the underlying mental architecture, and correlations in 
performance on separate tasks across individuals suggest that such tasks recruit 
shared underlying cognitive or perceptual mechanisms. This approach has allowed 
for the discovery of general intelligence (g), as well as more specific cognitive 
domains relating to distinct abilities. The important discovery of g allows us to 
successfully predict that individuals with high g will perform well on a variety of 
cognitive tasks, and those with low g will perform poorly on a range of cognitive 
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tasks. A different approach is taken within the field of cognitive neuropsychology 
when studying individuals with brain damage. Associations of impaired performance 
on multiple distinct tasks by neuropsychological patients are common and are 
generally understood to be because brain damage can result in impairments to 
domain-general systems or to multiple separate cognitive systems at one time. In 
this context, associations between different cognitive deficits in particular patient 
groups might reveal more about the physical pathology itself (e.g., spatially-
extensive lesions) rather than about the inter-relatedness of the underlying cognitive 
systems. For these reasons associations between impairments are generally 
considered to be inferior evidence for understanding underlying cognitive structure 
(e.g., Shallice, 1988). Instead, neuropsychologists favour the logic underlying 
evidence of clear dissociations between abilities. If one ability is normal and another 
ability is selectively and severely impaired in the same patient then there must be 
some important degree of cognitive and neural separation between these two 
abilities. Within the classic neuropsychological framework we can take Geskin and 
Behrmann’s observation that at least 20% of DPs do not have object recognition 
deficits, as strong evidence that aspects of face and object recognition ability 
dissociate in developmental cases and infer from this that there are separate 
cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying the development of these abilities.  
Moreover, there are many other good reasons to believe in category-
specificity in the cognitive and neural architecture (e.g. Kanwisher, 2010). Spatially 
and temporally distinct face- and object-selective brain activations have been 
observed with multiple experimental techniques (electroencephalography, functional 
magnetic resonance imaging, intracranial recordings). Causal links between 
category-selective brain regions and selective abilities have been strongly 
established through selective impairments due to brain damage (Susilo, Wright, 
Tree, & Duchaine, 2015), developmental disorder (Burns, Bennetts, Bate, Wright, 
Weidemann & Tree, 2017) and via brain stimulation techniques (e.g. 
Parvizi, Jacques, Foster, Witthoft, Rangarajan, Weiner, & Grill-Spector, 2012). 
Importantly, electrical stimulation of face-selective brain regions causes specific 
disruptions to face processing that appear to leave object processing intact. For 
these reasons we do not believe that Geskin & Behrmann’s observations have any 
impact on the general conclusion that face and object recognition are largely 
separate abilities at the cognitive and neural levels other than to show the possible 
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proportion of DP cases that demonstrate this important dissociation. However, we do 
agree with Geskin & Behrmann that the presence of a large proportion of individuals 
with co-morbid face and object recognition deficits is an important population-level 
phenomenon that is in need of an explanation.  
Although we suspect that Geskin & Behrmann’s estimate of 80% comorbidity 
in face and object recognition impairments is likely inflated by methodological 
decisions and the appropriateness of the available empirical data, it is clear that the 
true proportion of co-occurrence is well above what would be expected by chance 
(e.g. Zhao, Li, Liu, Song, Wang, Yang, & Liu, 2016). In order to understand this 
association it is important to consider that despite the substantial evidence for the 
separation between face and object recognition systems, they are not entirely 
functionally separate abilities. Performance on face and object tests co-vary well-
above chance, and it is an often replicated finding that approximately 10-20% of 
variance is shared between face and object recognition performance, with similar 
amounts of shared variance between other different object classes (e.g., Gauthier, 
McGugin, Richler, Herzmann, Speegle, & Gluick, 2014). Intriguingly, this shared 
variance appears to be relatively independent of g and therefore cannot be 
accounted for by general problem solving or executive factors. In addition, 
correlations in performance also tend to be much higher for tests that use the same 
object category for stimulus materials (e.g. faces, cars) even if the tasks have 
different cognitive demands (e.g. matching tasks and recognition tasks). Such 
observations indicate the presence of both category-general recognition 
systems/processes and category-specific mechanisms for faces and for different 
classes of object. These common systems might include memory encoding, storage, 
or retrieval processes that are generally required for recognition and episodic 
memory. Other common systems may include lower-level visual-perceptual 
processes that feed into both higher-level object specific and face-selective systems. 
If we assume that these types of system are partially separate and therefore have 
additive effects in terms of their impact on face recognition performance, then it 
logically follows that those individuals who have the worst face recognition 
impairments will likely have deficits in both category-specific and category-general 
systems. Conversely, individuals that demonstrate a clear dissociation between face 
and object recognition have problems restricted to face-selective systems.  
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We argue that the study of DP and other relatively-selective visual agnosias 
can reveal important clues about the underlying cognitive architecture. We have 
established that category-general mechanisms account for a relatively small amount 
of shared variance in recognition ability across the neuro-typical population. Yet 
according to Geskin & Behrmann’s analysis, the DP population generally shows a 
much greater association between face and object recognition than might be 
expected. This conclusion is consistent with the emerging view that face processing 
is often less functionally specialised in DPs than in the general population (e.g. 
Towler, Fisher, & Eimer, 2017). Because individuals with DP have impaired face-
processing systems, they may rely more strongly upon more general visual 
recognition mechanisms, and as a result often share more variance between face 
and object recognition. In contrast, neurotypical individuals without face processing 
impairments have developed efficient category-specific processing and may rely 
more strongly on separate category-specific systems for both faces and different 
object-classes. However, although it is often assumed that object recognition ability 
draws on a universally domain-general system in contrast to domain-specific face 
recognition ability, recent evidence suggests this assumption may be wrong. 
Individual differences research involving testing across multiple different object 
classes suggests they similarly share little association in the recognition performance 
for many types of object (Gauthier et al., 2014; Richler et al., 2017) – this low level of 
variance overlap is hard to reconcile with a single domain-general system for object 
recognition. Moreover, there is additional evidence that shows in some specific 
instances particular object categories may show much stronger association in 
performance (e.g., faces and bodies). Thus the pattern of performance comparing 
faces with various objects, and even performance comparing recognition across 
other different non-face categories is clearly complex – with varying degrees of 
association and dissociation in abilities. Thus casting further doubt on the idea that 
there is a universal domain-general system that can account for all variance in 
recognition ability. Importantly, such differences in ability do not appear to be easily 
accounted for by self-reported differences in visual experience alone, and that the 
likely cause of this variation may include heritable factors which impact on the 
capacity to learn about and take an active interest in different commonly occurring 
object categories (Shakeshaft & Plomin, 2015). 
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It is clear then that some individuals have generally high levels of object 
experience accompanied by low levels of general object recognition ability, and that 
these individuals also tend to have poor face recognition performance (Gauthier et 
al., 2014). Our interpretation of this complex pattern of evidence is that such 
associations must emerge as a result of the efficiency of the underlying category-
general visual learning mechanisms. Within the intelligence literature a similar 
phenomenon is known as Spearman’s law of diminishing returns; and we propose 
that a law of diminishing returns in the underlying general visual learning 
mechanisms can explain the strong association between face and object recognition 
impairments in DP. According to this framework the root cause of DP for these cases 
may be impairments in both category-general and face-selective visual learning 
mechanisms that can combinatorially disrupt the development of face-selective 
systems. Face recognition is the most apparent symptom of impaired visual 
recognition learning abilities for such individuals because it constitutes a visual 
category that all typical individuals acquire rich visual experience during the lifespan, 
and therefore have the most opportunity to achieve higher levels of performance and 
category-specificity. Geskin & Behrmann’s central observation that for DPs there is a 
disproportionately higher association between face and object recognition relative to 
the general population neatly falls out of the principles of this framework. Namely, 
that there is a single general visual learning ability – v, which can account for these 
associations (Gauthier, et al., 2014). However, because we have already pointed out 
that correlations in performance across different types of face and non-face object 
can vary in degree (even after experience is held constant), we remain cautious 
about whether there is a single underlying category-general learning mechanism. 
Taken together, it seems likely that there are multiple underlying learning 
mechanisms which impact differentially on different categories of object. These 
multiple learning mechanisms may include distinct perceptual and memory-related 
processes and will impact on different object categories to the extent that they place 
different demands on visual attention, perception and memory, and encourage 
individuals to engage in deeper levels of processing with particular kinds of object.  
In our view, in order to account for patterns of association and dissociation in 
cognitive performance we have to assume the existence of both general learning 
mechanisms (g, types of v) and domain-specific representational systems (faces, 
words, cars, bodies, etc.). It is important to note that psychologists have not given up 
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on the concept of g in the face of evidence that some individuals with pervasive 
developmental disorders have severely low g but islets of preserved or enhanced 
cognitive ability in specific domains (that would otherwise be strongly correlated with 
g). Within our framework, cognitive and neural category-specificity is the product of 
both domain-specific and category-general learning abilities that are constrained by 
heritable factors and extensive visual experience over development. This proposal 
asks only that we give up on extreme notions that either category-specificity or 
general visual learning ability can fully account for the developmental of cognitive 
and neural systems underlying visual recognition across the population. Geskin & 
Behrmann’s review draws our attention to the need for theories that can explain 
human performance both at the level of individuals and populations. We suggest that 
developmental cognitive neuropsychologists should aspire to integrate 
neuropsychological and individual differences approaches within their psychological 
and neurological frameworks. 
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